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Bond market transparency: To regulate or not to regulate… 
Jean-Pierre Casey* 
 
The present Policy Brief attempts to contribute to the ongoing policy debate on MiFID art. 65.1, which tasks the Commission 
with conducting a study to report on whether the trade transparency requirements that currently apply to share trading 
ought to be extended to non-equity markets. It presents the pros and cons of introducing greater transparency into the 
marketplace, including a model on the possible impact of increasing transparency. This Policy Brief also highlights the 
insufficient level of data available to market participants and regulators on volumes and aggregate bond market activity, as 
well as the lack of appropriate information made available to retail investors, suggesting that dealers may have little time to 
come up with a solution, and that an industry code of conduct may be an appropriate avenue – and one preferable to 
legislative initiatives – for introducing more transparency uniformly (within each fixed income asset class) across the EU. 
 
1. Introduction 
his paper aims to offer a nuanced view on a 
regulatory question that altogether too often 
becomes very sectarian very rapidly, pitting dealers 
in securities who are fighting to maintain the status quo 
against some regulators, who are pushing hard for change 
in the form of greater transparency in the bond market. 
The debate on bond market transparency is a difficult one 
due to the complex interaction and possible trade-offs 
between the policy objectives of market liquidity, 
transparency, stability, efficiency and investor protection. 
All of these are valid policy objectives; the critical 
challenge becomes one of finding the appropriate mix.  
Pre- and post-trade transparency may equally enhance or 
harm market liquidity and efficiency, depending on how 
they are applied, by whom, for what instruments, in which 
markets and at which latency. Likewise, transparency need 
not necessarily enhance investor protection, depending on 
how it is carried out and what the consequences of these 
measures are likely to be for various market actors, and 
since investor protection in fixed-income markets depends 
on many other (perhaps more important factors) than price 
transparency alone.  
This all means there are many nuances to explore in the 
debate on bond market transparency, and that it is 
therefore important not to become trapped in an 
ideological mindset. Rather, one should put one’s 
prejudices aside and seriously consider in an objective 
manner how to arrive at an optimal level of transparency.  
This paper intends to provoke the entrenched camps on 
both sides of the debate to this effect. 
2.  Why regulate transparency? 
The normative question of whether transparency ought to 
be regulated derives from the concern that the level, type 
and distribution of information prevailing in bond markets 
might be sub-optimal from the point of view of meeting 
the policy objectives of market efficiency and retail 
investor protection. If transparency is found to be 
deficient, it means that both market efficiency and retail 
investor protection could suffer, raising the spectre of a 
twin set of market failures. At least, this has been the 
Financial Services Authority’s rationale for looking into 
the possibility of further regulating secondary bond 
markets in the UK.
1 
On the one hand, opacity as regards essential trade 
information can damage the speed and quality at which 
new information is impounded into prices, causing the 
efficiency of the price formation mechanism to be 
compromised. Overall market efficiency will suffer as a 
result, since prices are that invisible hand that Adam Smith 
described to explain the miracle of efficient resource 
allocation; price formation (also known as price discovery) 
– generated by trading – is the mechanism by which 
market participants arrive at a consensus on the 
fundamental value of a security, enabling them to better 
determine how it fits in their portfolio of assets.  
On the other hand, regulators are concerned that the lack of 
transparency prevailing in fixed-income markets can breed 
a culture where execution results for clients are not 
considered a priority by securities dealers. Trading 
activities in the B2C (business-to-consumer) space are 
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especially fraught with information asymmetries that are 
characteristic of principle-agent relationships: the client 
who submits an order is at the mercy of the broker who 
routes or fills it. Thus, transparency is a powerful 
instrument in better aligning the interests of the principle 
and the agent: it allows the client to verify the quality of 
execution his broker delivered. The pressure on brokers to 
obtain the most favourable execution result for their clients 
by routing their orders to the venue that will best satisfy 
the client’s interest – rather than to the one that will yield 
the most kickbacks for the broker – is clearly a positive 
function of market transparency. 
Faced with the possible market failures associated with 
opacity, e.g. inefficient price discovery and the failure of 
brokers to execute under conditions favourable to the 
client, the regulator’s dilemma is to consider whether 
introducing greater transparency into markets can solve 
these actual or perceived deficiencies. 
A first step is to consider in which cases statutory 
regulation is warranted. Broadly, there are two different 
approaches to this kind of assessment, the first of which 
we can call the economic approach to regulation. 
Proponents of this school will want to ask certain questions 
prior to introducing new regulations (e.g. is regulatory 
intervention warranted?), and prior to developing a 
regulatory strategy once a course of action has been 
decided (e.g. will the proposed regulations(s) be able to 
overcome the perceived market failure(s) in a way that 
minimises compliance costs and foregone external 
competitiveness?). 
With respect to bond market transparency, the economic 
approach to regulation will encourage regulators to 
entertain questions such as: Is there a market failure? If so, 
can market-led initiatives or technological improvements 
substitute for new regulation? Will increased transparency 
improve overall market efficiency/liquidity? Will 
transparency improve investor protection (investor 
protection being one of the main policy objectives for 
which transparency is seen to be an effective policy 
instrument)? Will greater transparency lead to overall 
welfare gains for the economy (i.e. have a net positive, not 
a merely redistributive, effect)? 
On the other hand, what might be called the dirigiste 
approach to regulation proceeds from the assumption that 
statutory regulation is preferable to self-regulation and that 
some degree of statutory regulation is better than none. As 
a result, like justice under the code Napoléon, the dirigiste 
approach to regulation assumes guilt until innocence is 
proved by the accused. The burden of proof lies on market 
participants to demonstrate that there is no market failure 
with regard to transparency when regulators suspect there 
must be one based on whatever circumstantial evidence 
they have collected or mere suspicions they may have. 
Regulators adhering to this school will concentrate their 
attention on questions such as: Are liquidity providers 
making excess profits? Is transparency a mechanism for 
redistributing some of these gains to investors? Is the 
balance of power in the principle-agent relation skewed 
towards the service provider, and must regulation redress 
this asymmetry in favour of the consumer? 
In my view, the key point to address is whether statutory 
measures aimed at enhancing transparency will generate 
net welfare improvements for the economy as a whole. If 
they do not, they will amount to a pure redistribution of 
rents from the dealer community to investors. Though 
dealers may be loathe to accept such an approach to 
regulation, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with it in 
principle. As public authorities, regulators can reserve the 
right to effect such redistribution of rents; yet if they 
choose to do so, they should not pretend to have an 
economic rationale for regulation – theirs would be a 
purely political decision. In addition, they would have to 
anticipate how private actors who provide liquidity would 
respond to such a move – and whether it would verifiably 
enhance market quality (although market quality is not 
likely to figure high on the priority list for such a 
regulator). 
3.  Arguments in favour of more 
transparency 
A more cautious regulator will seek to balance the 
perceived benefits of introducing greater transparency with 
the costs that the economy is likely to incur as a whole 
from whatever approach he adopts. In terms of the benefits 
of market transparency, one can think of several reasons, 
discussed below, why more transparency in the bond 
market would be beneficial. 
Achieving and verifying best execution  
Pre-trade transparency is an important component in 
achieving best execution, whereas post-trade transparency 
helps verify best execution. Though originally a concept 
designed for equity markets, the obligation for investment 
firms to assure best execution for their clients will apply 
equally to bond markets in the EU from 1 November 2007 
under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID). To the extent post-trade transparency is an 
important element in verifying the quality of trade 
execution, it would not be very consistent if the European 
Commission did not mandate stricter and harmonised 
(post-trade) price transparency rules (or at least encourage 
the latter through an industry code of conduct) if it already 
imposes strict best execution requirements. The European 
Commission is mandated by the Council and the 
Parliament under MiFID (Art. 65.1) to decide a course of 
action on regulating bond market transparency by 31 
October 2007. However, if the legislative option is at all 
pursued, it could well be many months before a uniform 
degree of transparency is imposed on European bond 
markets due to the slowness of the legislative machinery in 
Brussels. This will create an awkward situation whereby 
best execution requirements are harmonised across 
European bond markets where different levels of price 
transparency prevail in different member states, leading 
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harmonised best execution rules. However, this 
discrepancy would only affect a minority of traded bonds 
(in volume terms): in government bond markets, about 
70% of trading volume is carried out on the MTS system, 
which is a trading platform common to all sovereign 
issuers in the EU, and on which pre- and post-trade 
transparency requirements are virtually the same across the 
system; and in corporate bond markets, 70% of secondary 
market activity is carried out in London, and thus is 
regulated by a single authority, the FSA.  
Valuation and asset allocation 
Calculating net asset values (NAVs) has become 
increasingly important with the explosion of bond funds 
and ETFs. Yet without timely, consistent, accurate and 
widely accessible data on bond prices, it is difficult to 
arrive at the NAVs, which bond funds typically calculate 
on a mark-to-market basis. Greater post-trade transparency 
would facilitate the calculation of NAVs. It would also 
facilitate the valuation of illiquid instruments through 
better proxies, e.g. matrix pricing. In the pre-trade space, 
more transparency would enhance the efficiency of asset 
allocation, with important implications for asset 
management.  
Lowering transaction costs 
By enhancing the competition between market-makers, 
more transparency should unleash competitive forces and 
lead to lower transaction costs. Opacity in prices makes it 
easier for liquidity providers to retain pricing power over 
their clients because it increases search costs for investors. 
High transaction costs can frustrate the development of 
vibrant secondary market activity and thereby reduce 
market liquidity. It must be noted however that spreads are 
paper-thin (and sometimes even negative) in EU cash 
government bond markets and are reported to be lower 
than those in the US market for cash corporate bonds. 
Essential non-price information captured in 
bond prices 
In corporate debt markets, price movements are critical 
inputs in modelling default probabilities. Price 
transparency can therefore be an important element of 
retail investor protection, especially if ongoing disclosure 
by issuers is not as rigorous as in equity markets, and since 
credit ratings often respond with a considerable lag to 
critical corporate information that should trigger ratings 
changes. This lag is due both to the nature of the ratings 
business, whereby reputational risk is incurred every time 
an agency moves ahead of others with a rating downgrade 
– leading to a certain inertia in ratings changes – and to the 
way ratings rely heavily on historical data, making them 
backwards-looking. Default probabilities on the other hand 
are forward-looking and thus are more reliable and more 
up-to-date predictors of corporate defaults. The problems 
associated with the lack of price transparency in EU 
corporate bond markets have certainly been dampened by 
the rapid rise of the credit default swap (CDS) market, but 
one cannot say it has been entirely resolved. Because the 
CDS market is more liquid and CDS prices are driving 
price discovery in the underlying cash market, modellers 
use prices on CDS contracts as references in the 
calculation of default probabilities. Nevertheless, there are 
sometimes situations where spreads widen in the CDS 
market and do so for no apparent reason that is linked to 
default probabilities, but rather arise due to market 
imperfections or the occasional market squeeze, for 
example, a shortage in the supply of deliverable underlying 
cash bonds. Improving price transparency in the cash bond 
market can help to increase the accuracy of calculated 
default probabilities by allowing one to gauge the quality 
of those derived from CDS prices against those derived 
from cash prices. Perhaps because the number of corporate 
defaults in the EU has been very low in recent years, 
insufficient attention has been drawn to the argument of 
improving price transparency to better capture the valuable 
non-price information that is implicit in the price of an 
asset. With a downturn in the credit cycle, this argument is 
sure to take on more weight.  
Data consolidation 
Since bond markets are characterised by a radical 
decentralisation compared to equity markets, efficient 
pricing would normally require that the various trading 
venues be inter-connected. Inter-connectedness is of 
course very difficult if not impossible to achieve in 
markets that are voice-brokered, as the bond market has 
traditionally been. However, because the percentage of 
trading volume that is conducted electronically is steadily 
rising in fixed-income markets, the potential for inter-
connectedness increases. Technological advances such as 
electronic trading along with the development of multi-
dealer-to-client (B2C) platforms have allowed for more 
transparency in a telephone-brokered market than in the 
past. A B2C platform, for example, can bring competing 
quotes of up to five market-makers simultaneously on a 
single screen, based on an inputted request-for-quote (by 
an institutional investor).
2 Ideally, in an integrated market, 
the same security will trade at the same price at the same 
point in time on multiple trading venues. In a decentralised 
trading environment, connecting the various trading spaces 
through data consolidation, such that the prices and 
volumes traded on some venues are visible on trading 
screens in other venues, will contribute materially to the 
quality of price discovery in the overall market. In the 
single market, similar transparency requirements would 
ideally be applied across all trading venues to facilitate 
data consolidation. While this is already the case for equity 
markets under MiFID (exchanges, internalisers and MTFs 
alike facing similar trade reporting rules), there is currently 
no such framework for bond markets. If trade information 
cannot be easily consolidated due to a lack of transparency 
or due to divergent transparency requirements across 
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different markets, overall price efficiency will suffer 
because search costs will be higher. High search costs 
damage the quality of price discovery by either 
discouraging investors from trading, or by reducing their 
willingness to search for better prices than those they are 
offered by their regular broker(s). If bond transparency 
requirements were harmonised across the EU, it would be 
far easier to consolidate bond data, leading to a more 
efficient bond market and to the development of more and 
higher-quality indices. 
Levelling the playing field 
Large institutional investors can probably obtain all the 
transparency they want out of dealers due to their value to 
dealers as important and regular clients, who probably 
generate fees for dealers in other areas beyond trading. 
However, smaller players cannot exercise this kind of 
leverage over dealers. Unless standard transparency rules 
are applied across the market, large players have an 
important information advantage. Smaller buy-side firms 
and retail investors suffer from the current lack of optimal 
transparency in the market, while large buy-side firms and 
dealers benefit from opacity at the expense of the former 
group, who can trade profitably on their information 
advantages. An industry code of conduct, or mandated 
transparency requirements (designed in close consultation 
with the industry) could help to close the information gap 
between various classes of market participants, 
contributing to market confidence.  
Index construction 
Indices can only be as good as their inputs. Good indices 
rely on high-quality and consistent price data. The TRACE 
reporting system provides just that in the US corporate 
bond market, presenting post-trade data in a consistent 
format that allows data consolidation and thereby affords a 
view of overall market activity. In the European corporate 
bond market, the iBoxx index covering liquid investment 
grade credits is a good start to more transparency, since it 
consolidates prices from the 11 investment banks who 
market-make in iBoxx-eligible bonds and publishes them 
in real time. These real-time quotes, along with the daily 
closing prices freely available on the International Index 
Company website, are already a significant step in the 
right direction. iTraxx does the same for the credit 
derivatives market. MTS indices and (recently-launched) 
index futures provide a similar function in the European 
government bond market, enhancing the quality of price 
discovery. Nevertheless, prices on Bloombergs and other 
terminals that rely on iBoxx feeds are occasionally several 
basis points off mark, undermining the quality of market 
data. Greater transparency of bond prices and volumes will 
also improve the accuracy of index-tracking. If greater 
transparency brings more traders with active trading 
strategies to the market, it will increase the regularity of 
trading. By leading to more continuous pricing rather than 
price movements characterised by sometimes significant 
discrete jumps as in the past, a smoother stream of orders 
will also have positive knock-on effects on the quality of 
bond indices. 
Improving liquidity 
The more homogeneous the liquidity needs of the trading 
community, the more likely it is that liquidity will freeze 
over in the markets, since market movements will largely 
be uni-directional. Fixed income markets have traditionally 
been dominated by institutional investors who pursue buy-
and-hold strategies for asset-liability matching purposes. 
While retail investors are also largely buy-and-hold 
investors, their liquidity needs fluctuate more regularly 
than those of institutional investors, so greater retail 
investor participation in the bond market should lead to 
more regular trading. Other players with heterogeneous 
trading strategies are also likely to come into the market as 
transparency increases, such as hedge funds which thrive 
on arbitrage plays on default, event, interest rate, inflation 
and liquidity risk. The presence of these groups of 
heterogeneous traders should lessen the volatility in price 
movements. Greater pre-trade transparency in particular is 
also likely to improve liquidity by tapping into unfulfilled 
liquidity demand (potential orders that are not executed 
because bond investors are unaware of existing trading 
opportunities).  
Enhancing disclosure of financial risks 
There is a marked tendency today to move towards fair-
value accounting, witnessed by the requirement for all 
listed firms in the EU since January 2005 to present their 
accounts in IFRS, which is based on fair value, rather than 
historical cost, accounting. At the same time, due to 
concerns about systemic risk in the economy and a 
preference for pre-emptive action to stave off financial 
crises, regulators are pushing for more disclosure of 
financial risk on a more regular basis for credit institutions 
and insurance firms alike. More recourse to, and more 
accurate, mark-to-market accounting can contribute to 
systemic stability by highlighting weak points in the 
financial system as they emerge. Greater transparency in 
bond markets can contribute to systemic stability: price 
transparency helps market-makers and credit institutions 
value their inventory and helps institutional investors and 
hedge funds to more accurately and regularly value their 
portfolio holdings. More transparency in bond and credit 
derivatives holdings can contribute to financial stability by 
helping financial market supervisors trace the path of risk 
as it cascades through the financial system.
3 
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4.  Arguments against more transparency 
In preparing this paper, it so happens that I have found 
more arguments in support of transparency than against it, 
but this is not to suggest that pros necessarily outweigh the 
cons in terms of total economic impact.  
Could damage liquidity 
Unlike equity markets, where liquidity is brought to the 
market by orders from investors – the exchange merely 
providing a service of facilitating the matching of orders in 
a consolidated limit order book – liquidity in the bond 
market depends critically on the willingness of market-
makers to risk their capital in proprietary trading to buy 
and sell blocks of bonds from their clients as a service to 
them. This activity is not without a certain risk: bonds tend 
to be illiquid, and the market is quite concentrated. As a 
result, if greater pre-trade transparency is imposed through 
regulation, traders could exploit the service market-makers 
provide to their clients by hitting or lifting bids or offers 
posted on a continuous basis in opportunistic fashion, 
especially if greater transparency is combined with market-
making obligations (as under MiFID for equities dealt by 
systematic internalisers or for EU government bonds 
traded on MTS platforms). In these cases, the profits of 
opportunistic traders would come at the expense of the 
market-maker and of the overall market, since it will 
discourage a dealer from providing liquidity, a public 
good.  
If introduced in a haphazard fashion, mandated post-trade 
transparency could increase the costs to dealers of 
providing liquidity, since real-time disclosure on large 
blocks of illiquid securities can lead other market 
participants to anticipate the need to rebalance or hedge 
inventory by taking exploitative positions in the swap 
market that will increase the costs of hedging to the dealer 
or by increasing the market impact of dealer trades by 
anticipating a dealer’s need to offload some inventory and 
front-running the inventory reshuffling in the cash market.  
The regulatory debate on bond market transparency has 
largely focused on the need to provide greater protection to 
retail investors. The law of unintended consequences 
always portends caution on the part of the regulator who 
seeks to alter existing market structures. Paradoxically, 
retail investors could even be worse off if market-makers 
withdraw their capital from liquidity providing activities if 
the costs/risks of providing this service are too great; the 
same can be said if greater transparency would erode the 
profitability of market-making to such an extent that 
dealers no longer find it a worthwhile activity for certain 
types of credits.  
The annex presents a very simple model of the market for 
liquidity. The model describes how introducing 
transparency could potentially reduce the supply of 
liquidity while widening spreads. It also measures the 
welfare impact of such a policy move, demonstrating that 
the economy can be worse off as result.  
While there clearly are merits to this argument of 
exercising regulatory caution to preserve market liquidity, 
one must not either succumb to a knee-jerk reaction 
against transparency nor defend the status quo at all costs. 
The model in Annex I also shows that depending on the 
consequences of greater transparency on market 
participants’ behaviour, there are also cases where 
introducing greater transparency can lead to net welfare 
benefits for the economy.  
Other instruments better suited for retail 
investor protection
4 
Although one of the pillars of retail investor protection in 
any marketplace is transparency, it is important to 
highlight that regulatory attention ought not to focus solely 
on transparency, as a number of more important variables 
can impact on the level of investor protection in the bond 
market. 
Fixed-income investments are associated with a wide array 
of risks, which retail investors may either not understand 
or remain completely oblivious to. Bonds are often 
presented as relatively simple financial instruments 
compared to equities. They typically offer annual or semi-
annual coupon payments that represent interest on the 
principal one has loaned to the issuer until maturity, 
whereupon the principal is recovered. However, to present 
bonds so simply is to mislead investors as to the true 
nature of risks they are undertaking when purchasing a 
bond. Not only does an investor face the risk of not 
recovering his invested principal, known as default risk, 
the value of his investment can also be negatively affected 
by interest rate risk, inflation risk, event risk and liquidity 
risk. These risks are largely unknown to the average retail 
investor.
5  
This is not to say that transparency is not an important 
component of investor protection. Transparency ought to 
be improved. But besides mere transparency, there is an 
array of flanking measures that should be considered in 
earnest by regulators if retail investor protection is their 
primary concern in the regulation of bond markets. These 
include: suitability of instruments (‘know your client’ 
principle); addressing conflicts of interest in, and ensuring 
principled distribution (e.g. in remuneration schemes), 
thereby reducing the risk of mis-selling; improving bond 
documentation; protecting invested principal against 
default and event risk; educating investors to the 
particularities of fixed income investments; and 
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encouraging indirect investments through diversified funds 
for risky products.  
An interesting related question is how is it that retail 
investors are allowed by regulators to buy individual 
credits but are often not allowed to buy e.g. a diversified 
fund. It shows there is an odd bias in the regulatory 
framework that makes little sense from an economic or 
indeed consumer-welfare viewpoint. This dilemma is 
primarily relevant to countries, such as Italy, Denmark and 
Spain, where bond markets are populated by a large retail 
presence. In the European bond market as a whole, retail-
investor participation only accounts for a miniscule 
percentage of trading activity in volume terms. Yet this 
fact is not a good argument in itself for not regulating: 
peoples’ savings are at risk, and these investments, though 
small in macroeconomic terms, can be large in terms of the 
invested wealth of a retail investor. The question is rather 
one of how to preserve the integrity and efficiency of the 
wholesale market while adopting a regulatory scheme that 
contributes to more retail investor protection. 
No clear evidence of a market failure 
One of the principal arguments that has been touted by 
market participants against introducing greater 
transparency in the bond market is the lack of evidence of 
a market failure significant enough to warrant regulatory 
intervention. This argument has found some backing, not 
least from the FSA, which found no compelling case of 
market failure in UK secondary bond markets. Because 
London accounts for up to 70% of secondary market 
activity in European corporate bonds, the FSA’s analysis 
ought to be treated with considerable weight. Others 
regulators, however, are not likely to be satisfied with this 
approach. The Italian market regulator, Consob, has 
consistently been pushing for greater transparency, owing 
to the large presence of retail investors in the Italian bond 
market and the losses they suffered in the recent past 
(Parmalat, Argentina) – nearly 30% of the Italian bond 
market is held by retail investors, a total that is often a 
multiple of the same figure for other EU countries and the 
United States (See Figure 1).  
Figure 1. International comparison (2004) 
 
5.  Lessons from TRACE 
We have all heard many times from industry 
representatives that the TRACE experience ought not to be 
the starting point for European regulators for the following 
reasons: there is greater pre-trade transparency in Europe 
than in the US; spreads are lower in Europe; the structure 
of the two markets is not directly comparable and the two 
markets operate quite differently; the conclusions of 
academic studies on the effects of TRACE which show 
enhanced liquidity in the US corporate bond market are not 
convincing because NASD does not want to share TRACE 
data with any independent researchers and the models used 
have their limitations. Rather than to bore the reader with 
the merits of these arguments, which can be judged for 
themselves, I intend to focus on some of the positive 
aspects of TRACE that are less frequently mentioned, but 
which are nonetheless important and relevant for the 
European corporate bond market.  
Though the bond market is characterised by 
decentralisation, it is little short of inexcusable that neither 
regulators nor market participants, whether institutional or 
retail, are unable to obtain aggregated information on bond 
market activity in a given day in the European bond 
market or volume data on individual credits. Although 
asset allocation is typically driven by price considerations, 
the information captured in traded volumes, with 
breakdowns by type of securities, is undoubtedly of 
economic value and could improve market efficiency if 
available to all. It is impossible to do so without a common 
reporting engine akin to TRACE, or at least without inter-
linked reporting systems whose post-trade inputs can be 
consolidated.  
Table 1. Trading activity in the US corporate bond market, 
3 November 2006 
  All 
issues 
Investment-
grade 
High-
yield 
Convertibles 
Total issues 
traded 
4,470 2,909  1,302 259 
Advances  1,516 857  540  119 
Declines  2,553 1,789  637  127 
Unchanged  135 44  83  8 
52 week 
high 
200 100  90  10 
52 week 
low 
50 36  11 3 
Dollar 
volume 
15,115 9,313  4,135  1,666 
Source: NASD website (http://www.nasd.com). 
Table 1 shows activity in the US corporate bond market on 
3 November 2006.  
The TRACE engine allows one to verify on a daily basis 
the total number of corporate bonds traded in the US 
market, with a breakdown into three sub-categories: 
investment grade, high-yield and convertible. It also 
documents the number of bonds that gained in price over Bond market transparency: To regulate or not to regulate… | 7 
the previous market closing as well as those whose price 
declined or remained unchanged. It provides 52-week 
high/lows. And the total dollar volume of trades is 
recorded. By any measure, this aggregated market 
information is a valuable resource for all market 
participants, dealers, asset managers, retail investors and 
regulators alike. While TRAX offers a similar service for 
Eurobonds and for bonds traded in the City of London, the 
service is neither comprehensive nor aggregated. 
Currently, the TRAX engine only enables one to obtain 
end-of-day data on individual securities, but volumes are 
often excluded. ICMA members only can get data on 
weekly or monthly volumes, but not daily data. One must 
also consider that these volumes only represent those of 
bond trades that are reported to TRAX, so even if ICMA 
would publish daily data on volumes, it would not 
represent an aggregate picture of bond market activity. 
  TRACE also enables market participants to collect 
information on traded volumes on individual bonds, which 
is a useful proxy to gauge the liquidity of these bonds. 
Table 2 shows the outputs that are possible to produce with 
TRACE data. One can compare the dispersion in liquidity 
among US corporate bonds by issuer, coupon, maturity 
and rating. In 2005, the most liquid corporate bond, a GM 
8 
3/8 2033, registered nearly 60,000 trades in 2005, or twice 
as much as the 5
th most-liquid corporate bond in the US 
market (another GM bond). The most liquid bond was 
three times more liquid than the 10
th most liquid bond, 
which suggests that liquidity in the bond market is 
concentrated in a few issues and that it quickly trails off 
subsequently.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Top 50 publicly traded investment grade issues by number of trades executed in 2005 (excluding convertible bonds) 
 
Top 50 publicly traded high-yield issues by number of trades executed in 2005 (excluding convertible bonds) 
 
Source: NASD, 2005, TRACE Fact Book (http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/reg_systems/documents/regulatory_systems/ 
nasdw_017618.pdf). 
 
Overall, I believe TRACE to provide three essential 
absolute benefits to the U.S. corporate bond market that 
must be considered seriously by European bond market 
SROs and regulators. (I refer to absolute benefits, because 
it is not sure that the net benefits, once one discounts the 
liquidity that may have evaporated from the market as a 
result of TRACE, is taken into consideration). These 
benefits are namely: 
•  As described above, TRACE gives all market 
participants and regulators useful information on 
aggregate activity in the bond market and volume data 
on individual credits  
•  Enabling retail and institutional investors to verify the 
quality of execution no later than 15 minutes after a 
trade.
6 This possibility puts pressure on brokers to 
ensure that they are consistently making efforts to 
place their clients’ needs over any professional 
arrangements or proprietary trading activities.  
                                                        
6 Some will argue that the notion of best execution is a pure 
theoretical construct that can only apply in perfect markets 
where there are no frictions, all information is available to all 
market participants, etc. The concept is difficult enough to 
apply to equity markets where trading typically is 
concentrated on a handful of trading venues, but in fixed 
income markets, it is a matter of great controversy over how 
exactly best execution can be applied and enforced. The 
vigorous debate surrounding the FSA’s suggested 
benchmarking approach attests to this. 8 | Jean-Pierre Casey 
•  By making post-trade information available to all, 
TRACE levels the playing field between various 
categories of market participants as regards access to 
information. Without a system like TRACE, large 
dealers, large institutional investors and active hedge 
funds have a clear advantage over smaller players 
because they will have a much better idea of what 
constitutes a good price for a given credit, which are 
the most liquid securities and where to find them – and 
they can trade on this informational edge to their 
advantage.  
6.  What incentives for the buy-side to 
promote greater transparency? 
This paper is not aimed at quantifying inefficiencies in the 
European bond market that could be tantamount to market 
failure(s). But clearly, insufficient information is available, 
especially for retail investors, in the European bond 
market. In addition, without a single trade reporting 
system, or at a minimum, data reconciliation between 
various trade reporting systems that would allow post-trade 
data to be consolidated, it is impossible to obtain an 
aggregate picture of the European bond market, including 
information on the total credits and volumes traded, with 
various breakdowns thereof. The bulk of information about 
bond holdings, pricing and traded volumes is probably 
visible to large banks in their dealing activities, as well as 
to their large and active clients. The unavailability or 
rather the inexistence of data on aggregate activity in the 
European bond market smells of a market failure. Will the 
market rise to the challenge of correcting it without 
regulatory intervention?  
When invoking the US experience with TRACE, and when 
comparing US corporate bond markets with their European 
counterparts, it is often noted that the EU corporate bond 
markets are more competitive, spreads are lower and pre-
trade transparency is higher. While this may well be the 
case, EU regulators cannot simply justify their inaction on 
the aforementioned market failure by saying that EU 
corporate bond markets compare favourably with those in 
the United States. European regulators are accountable to 
the European investor public and to users of EU financial 
markets irrespective of the regulatory situation in a 
comparable market in overseas jurisdictions, including the 
US.  
EU corporate bond markets may indeed be broadly 
efficient, but that does not mean there are not little market 
failures to correct here and there (such as the lack of data 
on volumes on individual credits or on aggregate market 
activity), either through regulatory intervention or by 
means of market-led initiatives that benefit from a bit of 
prodding from regulators.  
As part of any cost-benefit exercise that would accompany 
any proposed legislation, it is important to assess who 
benefits from the status quo and who gains from a change 
in market regulation to understand the dynamic of how 
vested interests colour the policy debate. Let us consider 
who benefits from the current relatively opaque European 
(corporate) bond market. Clearly, it is the leading dealers 
and large buy-side investors. One might think that if large 
institutional investors want more transparency, dealers 
would give it to them, so there is no need for regulators to 
interfere in the workings of the wholesale market. But 
large buy-side firms may want to preserve opacity in the 
markets, since they get good information anyway and they 
are big enough to obtain favourable prices from their 
dealers. Therefore, one should not expect the larger buy-
side firms to be clamouring for more transparency. Smaller 
institutions on the other hand may be dissatisfied with the 
current level of transparency in the market but may be 
reluctant to push for more, since they cannot exercise the 
same leverage over dealers in terms of the value of their 
business to dealers.  
Although the current level of opacity in the market does 
not benefit smaller buy-side firms and retail investors, it is 
unlikely that they will agitate for more transparency. It is 
not that buy-side firms would not necessarily prefer greater 
transparency in the market. Rather, one must consider their 
positions in light of the important business relations they 
maintain with dealers for other services – relationships 
these smaller buy-side firms might not be willing to 
jeopardise if dealers would come to see them as 
troublemakers on the transparency question.  
For example, just as the Gang of 26 negotiations quickly 
broke down when features of certain debt issues that were 
blacklisted (because of their failure to satisfy the minimum 
documentation standards the Gang of 26 had jointly agreed 
to enforce) made these same issues very attractive to the 
institutional investors who constituted the Gang, so also 
buy-side firms that may voice dissatisfaction with the 
current level of transparency in the bond market may 
decide to suppress their dissent to get in on attractive 
issues.
7 Examples of this kind of behaviour have emerged 
in EU securitisation markets, where some investors were 
privately very dissatisfied with the level of ongoing 
disclosure by issuers, but were publicly mute on the point 
in order to not compromise their ranking in the pecking 
order of key issues allocated by dealers in a market that is 
typically oversubscribed.  
To further this argument of why the incentive structure for 
various stakeholders in the bond market transparency 
debate might lead some pro-transparency parties to remain 
mute, pension funds and insurers want to match long-term 
liabilities with assets, hence their great demand to buy and 
hold long-horizon, highly-rated corporate securities. There 
is currently a serious shortage of long-dated debt securities 
to satisfy the demand for asset-liability matching by 
pension funds and life insurance companies who face 
increasing longevity risk and unmatched liabilities: KPMG 
                                                        
7 See “Improving Market Standards in the Sterling and Euro 
Fixed-Income Credit Markets”, October 2003 (to obtain an 
abridged version, go to http://www.abi.org.uk/Display/File/ 
364/newbondpaper.pdf). Bond market transparency: To regulate or not to regulate… | 9 
estimates a shortfall of up to £200 billion between the 
demand for and supply of long-dated corporate bonds, 
leading to a squeeze at the long end of the maturity curve.
8 
Given this shortage, paying a higher price on the one-off 
purchase of a security could be a small penalty to pay to 
get in to a hot new issue. This is especially true given the 
buy-and-hold nature of bond holdings in institutional 
investor portfolios: over time, the one-time (higher) 
transaction cost resulting from less competition among 
dealers because there is less price transparency will not 
come across as very important in economic terms, given 
the benefits of obtaining the debt issues that are vital for 
proper liability-driven investments. All this to say that the 
clamor for more bond market transparency from 
institutional investors would likely be greater if their 
position on the question could be developed independently 
of all other considerations that derive from the business 
relations they maintain with their dealers.  
7.  What kind of transparency is warranted? 
Who will argue that more information is worse than less? 
That more information made available to market 
participants will damage market quality? Hardly anybody. 
Markets thrive on information. The quality of a 
marketplace in any sector of the economy depends 
critically on the intangible assets and preconditions for a 
successful market economy that are publicly-disseminated 
information and contract law. The critical question 
therefore is not so much whether more transparency is 
needed, but rather how should it be introduced, by whom 
and under what conditions.  
The all-encompassing notion of transparency as applied to 
bond markets can mean a variety of things. It could mean 
price transparency – and even price transparency can be 
broken down into its pre-trade and post-trade components, 
each of which can be calibrated to the n
th degree in their 
implementation by regulators.  It could mean more data on 
volumes in addition to mere price transparency – without 
information on the quantity of bonds traded, prices are not 
as informative as they ought to be: comparing the price on 
a block trade of 5,000 bonds to the price of trading an 
individual security makes little economic sense. It could 
include the direction of trade (i.e. whether the trade was a 
‘buy’ or a ‘sell’). It could mean a certain delay in the 
dissemination of post-trade information to other market 
participants. This delay can also be calibrated to the n
th 
degree, depending on the relevant market or instrument. It 
could mean different ways to publish the disseminated 
post-trade information: ought it to be consolidated? Should 
trades over a given size be given abstract representations 
so as to protect liquidity providers from opportunistic 
behaviour that moves the market against them as they 
                                                        
8 Barry Riley, “Not only bonds but also backstops”, Financial 
Times, 6 November 2006. 
attempt to hedge or unwind the positions they have built 
up in dealing with their clients?
9  
Clearly, there is no right or wrong answer. Different forms 
of transparency can be implemented and considered 
appropriate for different instruments, which highlights the 
importance of regulatory flexibility as opposed to an 
established blueprint. The European Commission seems to 
have appreciated this nuance in its ongoing review.
10  
8.  Will market-led initiatives improve 
transparency? 
The key question then is whether market-led initiatives 
will be sufficient to satisfy the needs of retail investors, 
smaller buy-side firms and regulators. Markets need to be 
given a chance. But this chance has to be couched in terms 
of a limited window of opportunity after which regulators 
will be forced to act, either through an industry code of 
conduct (preferable) or through legislation.  
Encouragingly, we have recently seen some positive 
developments in market-driven initiatives to enhance 
transparency: the dealer community, whether pushed by 
greater competition or pulled by technological 
improvements, has moved towards providing greater 
transparency to the marketplace than was available to 
investors in the past. Initiatives include ICMA’s TRAX 
and TRAX2, MTS indices, the Iboxx/iTraxx indices and 
the development of B2C multi-dealer-to-customer 
platforms, which have greatly increased the degree of both 
pre-and post-trade transparency in the bond market 
(although to a lesser extent for the latter). In addition, a 
consortium of 11 investment banks set up LiquidityHub, 
an initiative aimed at consolidating liquidity and market 
data for electronic trading in the fixed-income market and 
due to be operational in 2007.  
Are these initiatives enough? I would argue not. Retail 
investors still lack good information access to the bond 
market; and all market participants along with regulators 
lack volume data and an aggregated view of the European 
                                                        
9 This will especially be important if the dissemination delays 
for illiquid securities are for very short periods of time. 
10 “…[T]he provision does not require consideration only of 
two options: full MiFID-style transparency for each 
instrument class or nothing. We believe the ‘extension’ 
referred to includes the possibility of adapting that regime to 
the characteristics of a particular instrument market, the 
nature of the instrument market concerned and the 
characteristics of the investors who typically use that market. 
Therefore, one possible outcome would be to have more than 
one transparency regime (for example, more than one set of 
post-trade publication deferrals for large transactions) for 
different instrument classes.” European Commission, Call for 
Evidence: Pre- and post-trade transparency provisions of the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 
relation to transactions in classes of financial instruments 
other than shares, 12 June 2006 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/securities/docs/isd/call_for_evidence_en.pdf) 10 | Jean-Pierre Casey 
bond market, both government and corporate, on a daily, 
weekly or other latency – a considerable shortfall. In 
addition, no consolidated tape exists post-trade to verify 
whether best execution has effectively been delivered.  
Are market-led efforts to overcome these deficiencies 
credible? The problem with a market-led initiative 
regarding post-trade transparency, in my view, is whether 
one will ever materialise – its development is rendered 
more difficult by the classic collective action problem: 
unless all dealers implement post-trade transparency 
together and in the same way, nobody will do it. No dealer 
has the incentive to move ahead with the introduction of 
greater transparency with respect to his dealing if not all 
others move with him. Otherwise, he exposes himself to 
risks from which the others will benefit. In addition, unless 
all join in on the industry-led initiative, whatever 
consolidation is arrived at will not be representative of the 
whole market. The first-mover disadvantage that 
characterises collective action problems makes it 
somewhat unlikely that market-led solutions to introducing 
greater transparency can work unless SROs take a strong 
lead and impose such measures equally on all their 
members. Their potential role in pushing their members 
towards an effective industry-led solution in this important 
debate cannot be underestimated.  
It is evident that dealers have a commercial incentive to 
prefer less, rather than more, transparency, since it will 
enhance competition and probably squeeze margins as a 
result – as well as costing dealers resources in terms of 
inputting the data (the large share of bonds are voice-
brokered as opposed to electronically traded). But nobody 
ever said the data have to be made available to all market 
participants for free! Revenues from the sale of data would 
allow dealers to recoup at least in part the ‘losses’ 
generated by higher post-trade transparency and possibly 
to profit from it if they move towards consolidating 
liquidity and data in a cost-effective manner through more 
joint efforts such as LiquidityHub.  
Here, I would like to raise what I call the paradox of 
market information: the market information is proprietary, 
and the dealer feels it belongs to him for commercial 
purposes. But information is not generated in a vacuum. In 
my view, therefore, a ‘market-maker’ is less of a liquidity 
‘provider’ than a liquidity ‘facilitator’: market liquidity is 
also brought about by the counterparty who makes a RFQ 
– it takes two to tango! Without a demand for liquidity, the 
supplier of liquidity would earn no revenues and generate 
no profits from liquidity provision. In addition, trade 
information is a public good in a market economy. 
Information on bond prices, volumes and yields has value 
that goes far beyond that created in the bilateral deal struck 
between counterparties: this information is used to price 
other assets (estimate discount rates), to mark portfolios to 
market and to assess inflationary expectations. So to the 
extent that dealers operate within a given market structure 
and rely on it to derive profits from dealing, they have a 
responsibility to sustain and enhance the efficiency of that 
structure. Also, to the extent ‘proprietary’ information can 
be a public good, dealers should make it available to the 
wider marketplace, but obviously should be allowed to 
charge for it.  
Will dealers overcome the existing coordination failure in 
markets? Will they ensure consistent pricing across a wide 
range of assets? Will they consolidate data to allow a pan-
European view on debt markets?  
Regulators should give dealers and bond market SROs a 
chance to develop market-led solutions to the 
unsatisfactory level of post-trade transparency in particular 
that prevails in the European bond market today. 
Alternatively, an industry code of conduct or mandated set 
of transparency requirements (designed in close 
consultation with the industry) could help to bring more 
information to the marketplace on volumes on individual 
credits – a good proxy for liquidity – and on aggregate 
bond market activity. In addition, more information that is 
relevant for retail investors in particular ought to be made 
available by dealers, not least because doing so could 
preclude the need for mandated transparency requirements 
on wholesale market operations – requirements that are 
designed with the retail investor in mind and thus are ill-
suited to wholesale transactions. Finally, increasing the 
level of available market information can serve to close the 
information gap between various classes of market 
participants, thereby contributing to market confidence.  
The legislative option currently hangs as a sword of 
Damocles over dealers’ heads that could drop at any time. 
Because of their flexibility and their proximity to the 
business, market-led solutions are preferable to legislative 
alternatives. But they have to be credible, and time is 
running short. That means the ball is in the dealers’ court. 
Now the key question is: Are they up to the challenge? 
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Annex 
A Welfare Analysis of Bond Market Transparency 
 
 
Graph I. A simple model of liquidity provision 
 
 
 
Graph 1 shows the base case scenario. The supply schedule is upward-sloping, because the higher the price of liquidity, the 
more liquidity a market maker is prepared to supply to the market. The demand schedule is downward-sloping because the 
lower the price of liquidity, the more the demand for liquidity is likely to increase. Where the supply and demand schedules 
intersect, the market is said to clear, or to be in equilibrium, because the quantity of liquidity supplied by market makers is 
equal to the quantity of liquidity demanded by investors. The supply curve represents the costs to the market maker of 
supplying liquidity. A market maker will not supply a quantity of liquidity that lies below the supply curve, since he would 
be making a loss on all the units of liquidity supplied that lie below the supply curve. However, a market maker is happy to 
provide liquidity if the price consumers are prepared to pay exceeds the cost of supplying that liquidity.  
When the market is in equilibrium, the total quantity of liquidity supplied to the market is the quantity where demand = 
supply, or Q*. The market-clearing price of liquidity is P*.  
Because for all units of liquidity up to Q* investors are prepared to pay more than the market maker charges for these units 
of liquidity, investors are said to “profit”, since they derive an economic benefit from obtaining a service at a price that lies 
below that which they are prepared to pay (the reservation price they are prepared to pay for each unit of liquidity is given by 
their demand schedule). Therefore, whatever lies below the demand schedule and above the equilibrium price P* can be 
called consumer “profits”. Since the cost to the market maker of supplying all units of liquidity up to Q* is lower than the 
price investors are willing to pay to satisfy their demand for liquidity up to Q*, the market-maker earns less profit on all units 
of liquidity supplied up to Q*. 
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Graph II. Base Case Scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
We now make a welfare analysis of the base case scenario to establish the respective welfare positions of market-makers and 
investors in the base case. This will enable us to verify who benefits and who loses when more transparency is introduced 
into the marketplace (subject to certain assumptions). In the base case scenario, if the market clears, the market maker makes 
revenues of P* × Q*. This is because at price P*, he is willing to provide Q* units of liquidity. And price × quantity supplied 
= revenues. Remembering that what lies under the supply curve represents the cost to the liquidity provider of providing Q* 
units of liquidity and what lies above the supply curve up until price P* represents the profits to the market maker of 
providing Q* units of liquidity, we see that the upper triangle composing square B represents profits and the lower triangle 
composing square B represents costs. Investor “profits” of consuming Q* units of liquidity are given by the area that lies 
under the demand schedule and above the equilibrium Price P*. This area is given by the triangle A. As we can see, in this 
example, the welfare positions of the market maker and of the investor are identical. (The areas of triangles A and B 
representing investor and market-maker “profits” are identical, so the benefits market makers and investors derive from 
providing liquidity and consuming liquidity, respectively, are identical).   
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Graph III. Scenario 1 
 
 
 
 
Graph III shows a departure from the base case scenario. Now, greater transparency has been introduced into bond markets 
through statutory measures. The increased transparency is assumed to increase the costs of market makers’ supplying 
liquidity. This is due to the greater market impact of inventory reshuffling and hedging as dealer positions are more visible 
through their trading activities, and the subsequent increased risk they face in their liquidity supplying functions raises the 
cost of supplying liquidity. If the cost of supplying liquidity increases for all quantities of liquidity supplied, as some 
observers say increased transparency will do, then the new measures will shift the supply curve upwards and to the left. 
Why? Because for every quantity of liquidity supplied, market makers will increase the price of liquidity to cover the 
increased cost of supplying that liquidity.  
Let us analyse the welfare effects of the increase in transparency, which we call Scenario 1. Triangles A and B represent the 
investor and liquidity provider profits, respectively, under the base case scenario. Triangles C and D represent the investor 
and liquidity provider profits, respectively, under Scenario 1. Because the statutory transparency measures introduced under 
Scenario 1 have increased the cost of providing liquidity for the market makers, the supply schedule has shifted upwards and 
to the left, representing both an increase in the price of liquidity (spread) and a smaller quantity of liquidity provided. 
Clearly, such a scenario leads to negative welfare implications for the economy relative to the base case. The net welfare loss 
to the economy is shown by the trapezoid E. The total losses to the market maker from the higher costs of supplying liquidity 
(profit effect) and of supplying less liquidity than in equilibrium (revenue effect) are given by the trapezoid H. However, H 
does not represent the net losses to the market maker. Because transparency has increased the price of liquidity (i.e., caused 
spreads to widen), the liquidity provider captures revenues that he previously was not able to capture because the base case 
price of liquidity P* is lower than the price of liquidity P
1 that prevails in the new equilibrium when more transparency is 
introduced into the market. As a result, the liquidity provider also makes some revenue gains in Scenario 1, but these gains 
do not compensate for the total losses, meaning that the liquidity provider makes a net loss in Scenario 1 relative to the base 
case: he is worse off by a margin of H – F, a sum equivalent to the difference in area between triangles B and D, which 
represent liquidity provider profits under the two scenarios. 
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Like liquidity providers, investors are also worse off (under the stated assumptions) as a result of the introduction of 
regulatory measures increasing transparency. This is immediately obvious from comparing the area of triangles A and C. 
The total loss of “profit” for investors is F + G, which is equivalent to the difference in area between triangles A and C. 
While the triangle G is a net loss to the economy, the trapezoid F represents a net transfer of wealth from investors to the 
liquidity provider, owing to the higher price market makers charge for providing liquidity.  
 
Graph IV. Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 2 is presented in Graph 4. This scenario assumes that while transparency will increase the costs to market makers of 
providing liquidity and subsequently lead them to widen spreads (price of liquidity) and reduce the supply of liquidity, it will 
also bring more investors to the market (see the arguments in Section III of this paper as to why this could be the case). More 
transparency could contribute to market confidence by making existing investors/institutions more willing to invest in and Bond market transparency: To regulate or not to regulate… | 15 
actively trade bonds, it can bring new types of traders to the market, and convert potential liquidity (willingness to trade) into 
real liquidity by bringing additional investors/traders to the market. All of this can lead to a shift in the demand schedule 
upwards and to the right from Dliquidity to D
1
liquidity, which reflects the increase in demand for liquidity at every quantity of 
liquidity supplied. Because there is more demand for liquidity for every unit of liquidity supplied by the market maker, bond 
investors are prepared to pay slightly more to obtain the finite units of liquidity that are available in the market at any given 
time.  
Interestingly, if the increase in market transparency leads the demand schedule to expand by an equivalent amount as the 
supply schedule, we observe that the net effect of introducing transparency is neutral from a welfare perspective. Consumer 
profits in Scenario 2, given by triangle I, are identical to those in the Base Case, given by triangle A. Likewise, liquidity 
provider profits in Scenario 2, given by triangle J, are identical to those in the Base Case, given by triangle C. As one can 
see, the equilibrium quantity of liquidity supplied to the market, Q*, is identical to the initial quantity of liquidity supplied 
under the base case. The only difference between the Base Case and Scenario 2 is that the equilibrium price of liquidity is 
higher. The reason investors are not worse off in terms of welfare is that under Scenario 2, the increase in transparency has 
increased the demand for liquidity, making investors more willing to pay a higher price to obtain it.  
Finally and importantly, one can deduce from this exercise, especially from Scenario 2, that if the positive demand effect of 
an increase in market transparency is greater than the negative supply effect, the equilibrium quantity of liquidity supplied to 
the market by dealers will actually be greater than it was in the base case scenario, prior to more transparency being 
introduced into the marketplace, meaning that the economy as a whole can derive a net welfare gain from a more transparent 
bond market.   
Graph V highlights how a positive demand effect from the introduction of greater transparency outstripping the negative 
supply effect leads to net welfare gains for the economy. The analysis of Scenario 3 is identical to that of Scenario 2, so all 
one has to do is to compare the respective sizes of the investor and producer profit triangles with those of the base case. 
Clearly, investor profits under Scenario 3, given by the triangle K (which includes the small triangle L – see geometric 
diagram below Graph V), are greater than those in Scenario 2, given by triangle I and triangle A for the base case (the latter 
two are identical, as explained above). Similarly, producer profits under Scenario 3, given by the sum of triangles B + M + N 
(see geometric diagram below Graph V), exceeds that under Scenario 2 (where the supply effect = the demand effect) and 
therefore that under the base case, where welfare effects are identical to Scenario 2. Because the sum of liquidity provider 
and investor profits under Scenario 3 exceeds the sum of liquidity provider and investor profits under the base case scenario, 
the economy as a whole has gained from the introduction of more transparency in the bond market.  
 
Graph V. Scenario 3 
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